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A theoretical framework for determining the minimum 
number of bidders in construction bidding competitions 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A theoretical framework for determining the minimum number of bidders in competition for 
projects in the construction industry is proposed. This is based on the neo-classical micro-
economic theory for price determination in construction and the assumption of random contractor-
selection. Empirical analysis of the Hong Kong data set not only illustrates the applicability of the 
framework, but also supports the relevance of the microeconomic model for construction price 
determination. The main implication for clients is that, in order to obtain the most competitive bids 
for projects in the most cost efficient way, they should vary the minimum number of bidders in 
competition according to market conditions. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper proposes a theoretical framework for determining the minimum number of contractors 
in competition for projects in the public contracting sector of the Hong Kong construction 
industry. The framework aims to provide a more cost effective approach for the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government to obtain competitive bids while continuing 
to maintain its public accountability. In order to provide a theoretical foundation for the 
framework, the linkage between market conditions and the degree of competition is explored. 
Based on the neo-classical micro-economic theory for construction price determination, it is 
suggested that the number of potential competitors in competition will depend on the market 
conditions. A set of regression models is formulated to estimate the number of potential 
competitors in the market. Following from this, the minimum number of contractors to be 
included in competition is determined. This is based on the assumption that the contractor-
selection process is random. The framework, however, does not quantify the cost effects of 
additional number of contractors in bidding competition for projects. An analysis of a data set 
from the HKSAR Government further confirms the applicability of the framework.  
 
Since there is a large amount of literature on tendering theory, it is not realistic to expect  a paper 
of this format to provide a comprehensive literature review, particularly, on the debate on the 
relevance of tendering theory and micro-economic theory for construction price determination (see 
Runeson and Raftery, 1998, for a thorough literature review).  Reference to the literature is made 
whenever appropriate. The primary purpose of this paper is to construct a framework for 
determining the minimum number of bidders in competition and to conduct an empirical analysis 
for testing the applicability of the framework. 
 
 
Construction price determination 
 
The construction economics literature containstwo fundamentally different approaches to 
construction price determination. The first is the probabilistic approach that originated from 
Friedman in 1956 and has gained wide publicity. There is a large amount of literature, that has 
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become known as tendering theory, on the analysis of how construction prices are determined (eg., 
Gates 1967, 1970, 1976a, 1976b, 1979; Rosenshine 1972; Dixie, 1974; Fuerst 1976, 1977, 1979; 
Weverbergh 1978; Benjamin and Meador 1979; Carr 1982, 1987.). .  
 
The second approach, by Hillebrandt (1974), follows the neo-classical micro-economic theory of 
price determination in construction.  A more comprehensive literature review and evaluation on 
the relevance of neo-classical micro-economic theory for construction price determination in the 
building industry was conducted by Runeson and Raftery (1998). They concluded that the neo-
classical micro-economic theory is a more suitable analytical framework than tendering theory, 
both in terms of its predictions and in the conformity with empirical studies of the construction 
industry. It is outside the scope of this paper to further evaluate the appropriateness of the neo-
classical micro-economic theory for construction price determination. Instead, this line of thinking 
forms the basis for the proposed empirical study. 
 
The basic assumption for application of neo-classical micro-economic theory in construction is 
that the building industry is very competitive and conforms to the model of perfect competition. A 
perfectly competitive market is characterized by the fact that there is a “going market price” (i.e. 
perceived equilibrium price) which all buyers pay and all sellers receive, and no one player in the 
market can individually affect that price. In other words, each buyer and each seller is much too 
small a part of the overall market to have their actions affect the market price. Other standard 
descriptions of such market include homogeneity of the product, perfect information and easy 
entry to and exit from the market. Here the market can be considered as a process of interaction 
between buyers and sellers of a commodity for a mutually agreed price (Perman et. al. 1999). A 
direct analogy in construction would be that the sellers are construction clients either from the 
public or private sectors who put contracts on the market in return for the construction services 
required to construct facilities to customized designs specified by the clients. The buyers are 
construction companies (or contractors) who obtain the contracts in return for a sum of money 
provided by the clients. Most contracts are awarded through competitive tendering processes 
where clients and contractors reach a mutually agreed price. Normally the contractors who submit 
lowest tender prices obtain the contracts. 
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In this competitive market, price determination is based on interaction of demand and supply. The 
market price for a commodity is the equilibrium price where the downward-sloping demand curve 
and the upward-sloping supply curve intersect. The construction industry responds to changes in 
demand in the short run by changing the price of its product and in the long run by a change in the 
capacity of the industry. On an a priori basis, it is assumed that firms in the industry would only 
tender when they have, or anticipate, excess capacity and would not tender when all capacity is 
being utilized. 
 
Consider a reduction in demand in the construction industry; lower prices will result initially 
because of the lower capacity utilization in the industry. The unutilized capacity in the industry 
will lead to lower marginal costs. The lower the marginal costs, the higher the opportunity costs of 
losing projects for individual firms and hence the lower the tender prices. As a result, 
competitiveness increases. In the long run, the industry will reduce the excess supply capacity 
because of insufficient profit and prices will be restored to their initial level. On the other hand, an 
increase in demand in the construction market will result in higher capacity utilization in the 
industry. The higher capacity utilization results in higher marginal costs and hence lower 
opportunity costs of not winning projects and hence the higher the tender prices. In the long run, 
the industry supply capacity will be adjusted and prices and profits will return to their initial level. 
 
 
Number of potential competitors as a measure of degree of competition 
 
Based on the above price determination model for the construction industry, changes in demand 
and/or supply will change the degree of competitiveness in the industry initially and result in 
movements in tender price level. In the long run, however, the supply capacity will be adjusted 
and prices will be restored. In this way, the degree of competition must be measured in terms of 
capacity utilization rather than in terms of the total level of output (Runeson and Bennett, 1983). 
In addition, it is a reasonable assumption that the number of potential competitors in the market is 
a reflection of supply capacity utilization in the industry. In line with this basic assumption, 
Runeson (1988) has estimated empirically that prices systematically changed by more than ± 20% 
over the economic cycle and that 85% of these price changes could be explained by variables 
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describing market conditions such as changes in demand and capacity utilization in industry. 
Therefore, the degree of competition in the industry can be measured in terms of the likely number 
of potential competitors for projects in the market and the degree of competition will depend on 
the market conditions. 
 
There is much empirical evidence showing that market conditions affect tendering behavior (e.g. 
De Neufville, et. al. 1977; Flanagan and Norman, 1985; Runeson, 1990; Rawlinson and Raftery, 
1997). The market conditions affect at least the contractors’ bid prices and number of competitors 
for a project. These are obvious as the price determination model suggested previously. De 
Neufville et. al. (1977) have shown that in a boom period (which they refer to as ‘good’ years) 
when there are more projects available in the construction market, contractors generally bid for 
projects at higher profit margins and competition for projects is relatively less intense. In a slump 
period (i.e. referred to as ‘bad’ years) with fewer projects available, contractors bid lower than in 
the boom period and competition becomes more intense. They have further shown that market 
conditions affect the number of competitors for a project. Interestingly enough, it is shown that the 
market conditions affect contractors’ bid prices independently of the competition intensity (or the 
number of bidders) for a project.  
 
 
Measuring market conditions   
No definitive measure for market conditions in construction exists in the literature.  It is suggested 
that, in these circumstances, the standard approach is to identify a measurable quantity that can be 
taken as an indicator, or proxy for the variable we are actually trying to measure (Flanagan et. al. 
1983). These proxy variables’ values, and changes in values, constitute an indirect measure of the 
variable we are trying to measure. In this sense, many possible proxy variables for market 
conditions can be envisaged. McCaffer et. al. (1983) used the ratio tender price index to 
construction cost index to represent prices changes due to market conditions. Flanagan et. al. 
(1983) used number of bidders received for particular projects as a manifestation of market 
conditions. They further suggested that the rate of change of a price index (such as Tender Price 
Index) would be a more appropriate proxy variable for market conditions. Runeson (1990) derived 
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an economic conditions index based on average of all tenders’ markup in an attempt to incorporate 
market conditions into tendering models.   
 
Because of data limitations, as in our case, there is no formal compilation of either a market 
condition index or building cost index in Hong Kong. For the purpose of this empirical study, we 
shall take the rate of change of tender price index TPI (hereafter denoted as TPIr) as an indirect 
measure of market conditions.  In Hong Kong, TPI is generally compiled by comparing the prices 
of a proportion of the items within a number of successful tenders during a given period against 
the price of similar items in a base schedule of rates (Chau 1998). It represents the cost a client 
must pay for a building. It includes all input prices and takes into account the prevailing market 
conditions. The movements of tender prices and input prices are monitored by tender price and 
building cost indices respectively and one of the major uses of TPI is for forecasting tender price 
level (Tysoe, 1981). 
 
 
Empirical Analysis (I): Minimum number of bidders 
 
As stated above, we shall use TPIr (i.e. rate of change of TPI) as an indirect measure of market 
conditions. Besides, we shall use 1/N as a measure of the degree of competition (since the number 
of potential competitors also depends on type of project and geographical location, the average 
number of bidders per project N is used) and examine the relationship between market conditions 
and the degree of competitiveness for each project in Hong Kong data set. In order to develop a 
regression model for 1/N using the TPIr as predictor, there are basically three steps involved. 
 
The first step is to use a polynomial to model the time series of TPI over a period of time. By 
using “time, t” as predictor in a polynomial regression analysis of TPI, we shall construct a best 
model of a polynomial of degree n as shown in Equation (1) below that provides a very good fit to 
the TPI. 
( )1                    ttt  tPIT nn210 ααααα +++++= ...332  
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Once the model of the time series of TPI is constructed, the second step is to differentiate the 
polynomial with respective to time t as shown in Equation (2) below. By substituting different 
values of t into Equation (2), TPIr values can be obtained for different values of t. 
( )2                    tntt  TPI -1nn21r αααα ++++= ...32 23  
                              
When TPIr values are found, the third step is to work out the ordered pairs of (1/N, TPIr) for the 
time period. Then a regression model for 1/N using the TPIr as predictor can be constructed as 
shown in Equation (3) below. Thus, based on this approach, we can estimate the average number 
of potential bidders N in the market for further analysis. Since TPI is a time series, inferential time 
series regression or autoregressive models can be constructed to forecast the TPI level in the 
industry. While there is a key advantage of regression analysis over other smoothing forecasting 
techniques (i.e. it provides a measure of reliability of each forecast through prediction intervals), it 
is generally risky for prediction outside the range of the observed data that may make the model 
(i.e. Equation (1)) inappropriate for predicting a future TPI level. Therefore, it is suggested that the 
forecasting of a TPI level in the industry is generally confined to the short run. 
( ) ( )3                   ...  TPI  TPIββ
N
1 2
r2r10 +×+×+= β  
 
One major problem facing construction clients, particularly the HKSAR Government, is how to 
obtain competitive bids for their projects in a cost effective way and at the same time maintain its 
public accountability. Traditionally, construction clients, at least for the HKSAR Government, 
encourage large numbers of contractors to submit bids for each project. Drew and Skitmore (1990, 
1992) have shown from their sample data set taken from Hong Kong’s private and public sectors 
that tendering competitions average from 10 to 17 contractors respectively. Several empirical 
studies have shown that greater number of bidders in competition for each project reduce the value 
of the lowest bid (Skitmore, 2001). However, there has been quite a body of literature concerning 
the issue of limiting number of potential bidders and bid preparation costs in competitive 
tendering (eg., Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1980; Skitmore, 1981; Scheizer et. al. 1983; Samuelson 
1985; Flanagan et. al. 1985; Wilson et. al. 1987; Wilson et. al. 1988; De Neufville et al. 1991; 
Holt et. al. 1994, Remer et. al. 2000). The key idea is that a large number of contractors in 
tendering competition will increase procurement costs. It is a waste of limited resources when 
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there are many competitors in tendering competition for projects in the market, for instance, 
during the period of lower demand level in the industry, while only the lowest bidder will win the 
project. The high proportion of wasted resources as a result of abortive tendering may offset any 
potential savings obtained from the lowest bid-win tender. Therefore, policies of limiting the 
number of bidders in competition would be beneficial to the industry as a whole.  
 
Some research findings recommend restricting competition to between four to eight contractors for 
each project (Scheizer et. al. 1983; Flanagan et. al. 1985; Wilson et. al. 1988; De Neufville et. al. 
1991). The main argument for this approach is that a higher number of contractors in competition 
only has marginal impact on the value of the lowest bid received. Another approach suggests that 
there exists an optimum number of competitors for each construction project. This approach is 
based on the assumption that (1) there is a quantifiable cost of tendering from the competitors 
associated with every bid; (2) the total cost of tendering increases in proportion to the number of 
competitors; and (3) potential savings diminish with increasing numbers of competitors. The 
argument for this approach is that ultimately this cost of tendering must be recovered from clients 
in the long run.  
 
Which approach to adopt poses one fundamental question: why do tenders vary? Only by 
answering this question can a well-founded theoretical basis for further progressive thinking be 
formulated. For this, Runeson and Raftery (1998) have given a comprehensive account of 
assessing the variations between tenders. They suggest that the neo-classical micro-economic 
theory provides an explanation of the variations in tenders that is consistent with the available 
empirical evidence. If their argument is right, then the above approaches fail to explain the 
fundamental question properly because they are based on the basic assumptions either implicitly 
or explicitly: 1) tendering is a random process and 2) there is a direct cost of tendering. There are 
serious conceptual problems concerning these approaches. Firstly, based on neo-classical micro-
economic theory, more tenders would not necessarily guarantee a lower price because price 
determination is actually based on interaction of demand and supply. Firms that are most desperate 
for jobs would also be the firms most likely to tender and thus the number of bidders is not likely 
have much effect on the price.  
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Secondly, even if it is assumed that more tenders result in lower price and there is a direct cost of 
tendering, the reduction in cost is for the individual project, but the increase in cost of tendering is 
an industry wide increase. A little reflection shows that two such different concepts cannot simply 
be combined and added together. Moreover, if it is assumed that the cost of tendering is a fixed 
cost, then the arguments for these approaches fail to stand as well. For instance, if it is assumed 
that there are 10 firms each with an estimating department set up to produce 20 estimates per year, 
then there are 200 estimates per year for the market. If it is assumed further that one year there are 
100 new projects coming on the market, while the next year there are only 20 new projects, the 
cost of tendering has not changed for the industry or the firm but the average number of estimates 
per project has increased from 2 to 10. 
 
Instead of the above approaches evaluated, another approach will be suggested based on micro-
economic theory for construction price determination in tendering.  This assumes all bidders to be 
equally competitive.  This leads to variations in tenders received, with the selection of contractors 
to submit tenders being assumed to be random for the purposes of of public accountability. Of 
course, auxiliary assumptions can be formulated in such a way that this does not necessarily 
follow. (?? WHAT DOES THIS MEAN??) 
 
If the random selection of equally competitive contractors assumption is adopted, then the 
problem of predicting the lowest tender is non-deterministic. Skitmore (1981) assumed a random 
contractor-selection process in tendering to predict tender prices. He used an example in which 
samples of six bidders to submit tenders were selected from a population of 20 potential bidders. 
He then worked out the frequency distribution of the bidders’ success from all possible 
combinations of six bidders. From this example he showed that random selection of bidders 
reduces the predictability of the lowest tender by reducing the chances of including potentially low 
tenders, while increasing the number of bidders in competition will increase predictability. In 
other words, it is impossible to predict the lowest tender with certainty. The best that can be 
achieved is to predict a range of values where the lowest tender is expected to land. Following 
Skitmore’s (1981) example, instead of grouping a population of 20 potential bidders into 
ascending order of potential values, N potential bids will be arranged in ascending order of tender 
prices and numbered X accordingly.  
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After determining the average number of potential bidders N in the market from the set of 
equations (1-3), suppose that these N potential bidders in the market are on the approved list and 
they would have estimated their potential tender prices if they were asked to submit tenders for 
this project.  
        { }tenders. N of  group the  in  lowest X ranked is bid  potential    whereN ..., 3, 2, 1,  X th=  
 
From these N potential contractors, k contractors will be selected at random to submit their 
tenders. Then total number of possible competitions for this project can be calculated by Equation 
4 as shown below: 
         ( )4                
k
N
 project this for nscompetitio  possible of number Total ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=  
 
The probability of Xth lowest bid in N bids is the lowest bid in competition is given by the 
probability density function f(N, k)(x) when randomly selecting k contractors from the group of N 
potential contractors:     
( ) ( ) ( )5        1k-N ... 2, 1,  x where          
k
N
1k
xN
xf     k N, +=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
=
 
 
The simplest way to identify the lowest bid (i.e. X = 1) from the group of N potential contractors is 
to ask all of them to submit their tenders. However, as mentioned before, this would not be cost 
effective. Therefore, the most important question now becomes: how can the chance of including 
the most competitive bids be maximized, by randomly selecting k number of contractors in 
competition for this project once the average number of potential contractors N competing for this 
project in the market is estimated? While there is no theoretical definition for the meanings of 
maximizing the chance and the most competitive bids, for simplicity and practicality, maximizing 
the chance will be taken at the 95% confidence level and the most competitive bids refer to one of 
the first four lowest bids among the N potential competitors. In other words, there exists an 
‘optimum’ value of k for each N such that a 95% confidence level of including one of the first four 
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lowest bids in competition for this project can be obtained. Based on this criterion, the minimum 
number of contractors to submit tenders for projects will depend on the potential number of 
bidders N in the market that in turn will depend on the market conditions.  
 
Suppose it is estimated that the average number of competitors (N) in the market for a particular 
project is 20 based on market conditions from the set of equations (1-3). A probability density 
function for randomly selecting the k number of bidders per project to submit bids can be 
established. The probability and cumulative probability distribution values of winning tenders for 
selecting k contractors from N = 20 potential competitors in the market is shown in Table 1. The 
cumulative probability distributions as shown in Figure 1 indicate that the k values affect the range 
of lowest bids received. As k value increases from 3 to 10, the range of potential lowest bids in 
competitions reduces from the lowest possible eighteenth bid in N bids received to the lowest 
possible tenth bid in N bids received. Therefore, it is desirable, at least from the client’s viewpoint, 
that those lowest potential bids in N bids will have higher chances of being included in tendering 
competitions while those higher potential bids in N bids will be excluded from the tendering 
process. The winning tender will fall within a range of values depending on the choice of k. 
However, in order to include the one of the first four lowest bidders in competition for projects at 
95% confidence level, the minimum number of contractors to submit tenders is when k = 10 
giving the cumulative probability of 0.9567.   
 
From the foregoing empirical analysis, a theoretical framework for determining the minimum 
number of competitors to be included in construction bidding competitions for projects has been 
proposed. The following empirical analysis on a HKSAR Government data set will set out to test 
the applicability of the framework. 
 
 
Empirical analysis (II): Hong Kong Data Set 
 
The following empirical analysis is based on a sample of 229 projects with 3,285 bids received 
over the period from the fourth quarter of 1990 to the third quarter of 1996. The sample was 
derived from HKSAR Government Architectural Services Department (ASD). Projects awarded 
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through selective tendering (where the number of competitors is an administrative decision rather 
than a consequence of market conditions) have been excluded for homogeneity purposes. Figure 2 
shows the positively skewed frequency distribution of number of bidders per project for the data 
set. On average, there are 14 contractors, ranging from 3 to 33 with standard deviation of about 7, 
competing for each contract. 
 
Number of bidders per project
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Figure 2. Distribution of number of bidders for ASD projects (1990 – 1996) 
 
Table 2 shows the variations in TPI level and the average number of contractors per project N for 
the data set. The TPI used is a quarterly index compiled by ASD primarily as an aid to adjust 
building cost data for estimating purposes. It is prepared also to provide an indication of the price 
level of tender prices for new building works undertaken by ASD.  
 
The best model (i.e. using time t as predictor in a polynomial regression analysis of TPI) is found 
to be a polynomial of degree 3 as shown below. This polynomial, as shown in Figure 3, provides a 
very good fit to the TPI as the corresponding R-square is 0.9773 and the residual plot exhibits no 
special pattern for violation of regression assumptions.  
( ) 0.9773R                       0.0419t-t37.624t-PIT 23 =+= 2893.2617.695  
Hence, the rate of change TPIr at time = t is given by the following equation: 
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By substituting different values of t into the above equation, 24 ordered pairs of (1/N, TPIr) can be 
found as shown in Table 3 and the scatter plot of these 24 ordered pairs is produced as shown in 
Figure 4. The plot shows a non-linear relationship between 1/N and TPIr. A regression model can 
be established to best fit the set of data with the following result: R2 = 0.7550 and F = 32.36 (p-
value < 0.0001): 
)7550.000003809.00007134.004843.1 =+×+= 22rr (R          TPITPI0N  
 
Suppose the forecast of TPIr (i.e. the rate of change of TPI) is 23, then from the above regression 
model, the estimated potential number of competitors for a project is N = 12. The probability 
density function values for randomly selecting the k number of bidders per project to submit bids 
is as shown in Table 4. At 95% confidence level to include at least one of the first four lowest 
bidders among 12 potential competitors in competition, the minimum number of contractors to 
submit tenders is when k = 6 giving cumulative probability of 0.9697. 
 
Therefore, by randomly selecting six contractors from the approved list qualified contractors to 
submit tenders to compete for a project in this period, the HKSAR Government can have a 95% 
confidence that at least one of the first four lowest bids in the market will be included in 
competition for projects. In this way, not only will this approach be more cost effective in terms of 
procurement costs, but also the Government can still maintain its public accountability in the 
tendering competitions.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper sets out to explore and demonstrate a theoretical linkage between the market conditions 
and number of potential contractors in competition. Based on neo-classical micro-economic theory 
for construction price determination and the assumption of random selection of equally 
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competitive contractors in the bidding competitions, a theoretical framework for determining the 
minimum number of competitors in the tendering process is proposed. The framework comprises 
two basic parts. The first part applies micro-economic theory in linking changes in demand to 
changes in prices and subsequent changes in supply capacity to explain construction price 
determination and tender variations. The rate of change of TPI is used to measure market 
conditions in the building industry and the degree of competition can be measured in terms of 
number of potential competitors in the market. From these, a set of regression models is 
formulated to estimate the number of potential contractors competing in the market by the forecast 
TPI level. The second part determines the minimum number of contractors to submit tenders for 
the particular projects concerned such that a 95% confidence (STEPHEN – WHAT HAPPENS IF 
A DIFFERENT % LEVEL IS NEEDED?  CAN WE DRAW A GRAPH SHOWING THE 
RESULTS FOR EACH % VALUE INSTEAD OF JUST 95%??) can be achieved that one of the 
first four lowest bids in market will be included in bidding competitions. 
 
The implication is that the HKSAR Government can derive a more cost effective approach in its 
open tendering system by selecting the minimum number of contractors k in bidding competitions 
based on the market conditions (or the TPIr value) while maintaining its public accountability for 
contractor-selection in tendering. The limitations for this framework are 1) the prediction of TPI is 
generally confined to the short term because of less accuracy of forecasts farther into the future 
and hence may make the TPI forecasting model inappropriate; and 2) the framework is based on 
the assumption that contractors are equally competitive and the contractor-selection process is 
random. It remains possible that the selection of contractors in competition for particular projects 
will not be simply a random choice that reduces the range of lowest tenders. Further research is 
necessary to quantify the opportunity costs involved. 
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X f (2 0 , 3 ) (x ) ∑ f (2 0 , 3 ) (x ) f (2 0 , 5 ) (x ) ∑ f (2 0 , 5 ) (x ) f (2 0 , 1 0 ) (x ) ∑ f (2 0 , 1 0 ) (x )
1 0 .1 5 0 0 0 .1 5 0 0 0 .2 5 0 0 0 .2 5 0 0 0 .5 0 0 0 0 .5 0 0 0
2 0 .1 3 4 2 0 .2 8 4 2 0 .1 9 7 4 0 .4 4 7 4 0 .2 6 3 2 0 .7 6 3 2
3 0 .1 1 9 3 0 .4 0 3 5 0 .1 5 3 5 0 .6 0 0 9 0 .1 3 1 6 0 .8 9 4 7
4 0 .1 0 5 3 0 .5 0 8 8 0 .1 1 7 4 0 .7 1 8 3 0 .0 6 1 9 0 .9 5 6 7
5 0 .0 9 2 1 0 .6 0 0 9 0 .0 8 8 0 0 .8 0 6 3 0 .0 2 7 1 0 .9 8 3 7
6 0 .0 7 9 8 0 .6 8 0 7 0 .0 6 4 6 0 .8 7 0 9 0 .0 1 0 8 0 .9 9 4 6
7 0 .0 6 8 4 0 .7 4 9 1 0 .0 4 6 1 0 .9 1 7 0 0 .0 0 3 9 0 .9 9 8 5
8 0 .0 5 7 9 0 .8 0 7 0 0 .0 3 1 9 0 .9 4 8 9 0 .0 0 1 2 0 .9 9 9 6
9 0 .0 4 8 2 0 .8 5 5 3 0 .0 2 1 3 0 .9 7 0 2 0 .0 0 0 3 0 .9 9 9 9
1 0 0 .0 3 9 5 0 .8 9 4 7 0 .0 1 3 5 0 .9 8 3 7 0 .0 0 0 1 1 .0 0 0 0
1 1 0 .0 3 1 6 0 .9 2 6 3 0 .0 0 8 1 0 .9 9 1 9 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 2 0 .0 2 4 6 0 .9 5 0 9 0 .0 0 4 5 0 .9 9 6 4 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 3 0 .0 1 8 4 0 .9 6 9 3 0 .0 0 2 3 0 .9 9 8 6 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 4 0 .0 1 3 2 0 .9 8 2 5 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .9 9 9 6 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 5 0 .0 0 8 8 0 .9 9 1 2 0 .0 0 0 3 0 .9 9 9 9 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 6 0 .0 0 5 3 0 .9 9 6 5 0 .0 0 0 1 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 7 0 .0 0 2 6 0 .9 9 9 1 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 8 0 .0 0 0 9 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 9 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
2 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
Table 1: Probability and cumulative probability distribution values of winning tenders for N = 20 
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Figure 1. Cumulative probability distribution values of winning tenders for N = 20 
 F(20, 10)(x) 
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Year Quarter Time t TPI No. of projects
Total number 
of bidders
Av. No. of bidders 
/ project  (N)
1990 4 1 596 8 112 14
1991 1 2 608 6 116 19
2 3 592 5 119 24
3 4 573 9 204 23
4 5 515 8 189 24
1992 1 6 531 10 189 19
2 7 548 6 129 22
3 8 519 6 99 17
4 9 518 8 148 19
1993 1 10 527 10 158 16
2 11 527 4 61 15
3 12 541 7 98 14
4 13 563 5 100 20
1994 1 14 586 14 239 17
2 15 594 7 81 12
3 16 615 14 210 15
4 17 666 9 98 11
1995 1 18 708 14 171 12
2 19 712 11 110 10
3 20 733 17 142 8
4 21 747 13 123 9
1996 1 22 772 14 157 11
2 23 813 10 121 12
3 24 848 14 111 8
Total 229 3,285
Table 2: Variations of TPI and Average Number of bidders N (1990 - 1996)  
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Figure 3. Polynomial regression analysis of TPI using time t as predictor 
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Year Quarter Time t TPI TPIr
Av. No. of bidders 
/ project  (N) 1/N
1990 4 1 596 -31.9637 14 0.0714
1991 1 2 608 -26.5548 19 0.0517
2 3 592 -21.3973 24 0.0420
3 4 573 -16.4912 23 0.0441
4 5 515 -11.8365 24 0.0423
1992 1 6 531 -7.4332 19 0.0529
2 7 548 -3.2813 22 0.0465
3 8 519 0.6192 17 0.0606
4 9 518 4.2683 19 0.0541
1993 1 10 527 7.6660 16 0.0633
2 11 527 10.8123 15 0.0656
3 12 541 13.7072 14 0.0714
4 13 563 16.3507 20 0.0500
1994 1 14 586 18.7428 17 0.0586
2 15 594 20.8835 12 0.0864
3 16 615 22.7728 15 0.0664
4 17 666 24.4107 11 0.0918
1995 1 18 708 25.7972 12 0.0819
2 19 712 26.9323 10 0.1000
3 20 733 27.8160 8 0.1197
4 21 747 28.4483 9 0.1057
1996 1 22 772 28.8292 11 0.0892
2 23 813 28.9587 12 0.0826
3 24 848 28.8368 8 0.1261
Table 3: Variations of TPIr and 1/N (1990 - 1996)  
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of TPIr and 1/N 
 
 
 
X f (1 2 , 4 ) (x ) ∑ f (1 2 , 4 ) (x ) f (1 2 , 5 ) (x ) ∑ f (1 2 , 5 ) (x ) f (1 2 , 6 ) (x ) ∑ f (1 2 , 6 ) (x )
1 0 .3 3 3 3 0 .3 3 3 3 0 .4 1 6 7 0 .4 1 6 7 0 .5 0 0 0 0 .5 0 0 0
2 0 .2 4 2 4 0 .5 7 5 8 0 .2 6 5 2 0 .6 8 1 8 0 .2 7 2 7 0 .7 7 2 7
3 0 .1 6 9 7 0 .7 4 5 5 0 .1 5 9 1 0 .8 4 0 9 0 .1 3 6 4 0 .9 0 9 1
4 0 .1 1 3 1 0 .8 5 8 6 0 .0 8 8 4 0 .9 2 9 3 0 .0 6 0 6 0 .9 6 9 7
5 0 .0 7 0 7 0 .9 2 9 3 0 .0 4 4 2 0 .9 7 3 5 0 .0 2 2 7 0 .9 9 2 4
6 0 .0 4 0 4 0 .9 6 9 7 0 .0 1 8 9 0 .9 9 2 4 0 .0 0 6 5 0 .9 9 8 9
7 0 .0 2 0 2 0 .9 8 9 9 0 .0 0 6 3 0 .9 9 8 7 0 .0 0 1 1 1 .0 0 0 0
8 0 .0 0 8 1 0 .9 9 8 0 0 .0 0 1 3 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
9 0 .0 0 2 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 1 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
1 2 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0
 Table 4: Probability and cumulative probability distribution values of winning tenders for N = 12 
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